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DAMAGES

By EDGAR HUNTER WILSON*
The damage problems presented to the appellate courts of Georgia during the sufvey period have been few. The cases, however, are well-dispersed
over the field of damages.
On the question of excessive verdicts the two Divisions of the Court of
Appeals sitting en banc rendered a disturbing decision in WJ'estern & Atlantic R. Co. v. Wright.' Plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her brother,
who was an employee of the defendant. It was established that the deceased
was 37 years old and earning between $125 and $130 per month. Plaintiff
testified that the deceased contributed about $40 per month to her support.
The dissent noted that it was also in evidence that the plaintiff's husband
was dead and that the deceased was unmarried, lived with the plaintiff and
in all ways acted as head of the house (facts left unmentioned in the majority opinion). The jury returned a verdict for $20,000. Notwithstanding the usual discretion allowed the jury in a case of this nature, the court
reversed the judgment on the ground that the verdict was obviously due to
error, prejudice or gross mistake-that the jury applied a life expectancy
much greater than ever attained in modern times. Justice Felton in a very
able and lone dissent noted that this was the second time a jury had returned a verdict of $20,000 in this case. Curiously enough, the plaintiff
had voluntarily written off $Io,ooo of the judgment before appeal. What
influence this had on the court is wholly a matter of conjecture. And, of
course, the court was correct in holding that relinquishing a portion of the
judgment would not remedy the defect if the verdict actually was the result of gross mistake or prejudice.
Determining when the court will condemn a verdict as excessive becomes
even more difficult when the above case is compared with Western & Atlan.
tic R.R. v. Burnett,2 decided barely a month earlier by the same bench.' In
the Burnett case the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, sued for personal injuries received when he was struck by a switch engine. Plaintiff, a
man of fifty years, lost a leg, injured a shoulder and sustained back injuries. The earning capacity of the plaintiff at the time of injury was ten
dollars per day. The jury returned a verdict for $65,000 which the court
found did not suggest error, bias and prejudice or mistake on the part of
the jury. The court went to great lengths to explain how flagrant the
amount awarded had to be in comparison to the damage suffered for the
court to over-ride the verdict of the jury.
The rule regarding excessive verdicts is simple to state, but these two
*Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University;
LL.B., 1948, LL.M., 1948, Duke University School of Law; Member North Carolina
and Georgia Bar Associations.

1. 79 Ga. App. 733, 54 S.E.2d 655 (1949).
2. 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E.2d 357 (1949).
3. This case was decided shortly prior to the beginning date of the survey. It is discussed here for purposes of comparison.
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cases show that, when it comes to specific application of the rule, lawyers
are left largely to guesswork. Although the same measure of damages
would not have been proper,' the reversal of the $65,0oo personal injury
recovery and affirmance of the $20,000 wrongful death recovery would
not have seemed illogical.
In Meadows v J/aughan5 the defendant sought reversal of an adverse
judgment on the grounds that the judgment was excessive and that the
evidence did not warrant an award of punitive damages. Defendant, claiming ownership, took the plaintiff's dog from his yard. While the plaintiff,
with his hand through the window of the defendant's truck, was "remonstrating," the defendant drove off. Plaintiff was thrown to the ground
and as a result of injuries received missed several days of work. Plaintiff
sued for $2,5oo actual and $7,500 punitive damages based on an intentional and malicious wrong. He received a judgment for $1,8oo. The Court
of Appeals, in ruling that the judgment was not excessive and that there
was sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages, relied on
the Code test for punitive damages.'
Coleman v. Garrison7 and Minor v. Fincher8 involved the problem of the
measure of damages where timber has been wrongfully cut and removed.
In the Coleman case, which was framed in trespass, the Court of Appeals
relied on Code Section IO5-2013 which lays down the following test:
1. Where defendant is a wilful trespasser, the full value of the property at
the time and place of demand or suit, without deduction for his labor or expense.
2. Where defendant is an unintentional or innocent trespasser, or innocent
purchaser from such trespasser, the value at the time of conversion, -less the
value he or his vendor added to the property.
3. Where defendant is a purchaser without notice from a wilful trespasser,
the value at the time of such purchase."

The court concluded that if the jury found that the trespass was wilful,
the verdict of $750 was within the bounds of the evidence.
In the Minor case the action seemed to be framed in trover and the trial
judge had instructed, in accordance with Code Section 107-103, that the
measure of damages would be the "highest value of lumber, of the grade
removed from her land, between the date of the filing of the suit and the
date of trial." The Supreme Court found this instruction to be erroneous,
and held that Code Section 105-2013, supra, presents the proper measure
for timber cut and removed whether the action be in trover or trespass.
The court expressly disapproved of a contrary line of decisions following
Milltown Lumber Co. v. Carter.9
Fox Motor Co. v. Dillard"raised the question of whether a contract provision for the defendant to pay $750 in the event of his breach of contract
amounted to a penalty or liquidated damages. The court correctly stated
4. The Burnett case involved an action for personal injuries whereas the Wright case
was an action for wrongful death, and therefore a different measure of damages is
applicable.
5. 81 Ga. App. 45, 57 S.E.2d 689 (1950).
6. GA. CODE § 105-2002 (1933).

7.
8.
9.
10.

80 Ga. App. 328, 56 S.E.2d 144 (1949).
206 Ga. 721, 58 S.E.2d 389 (1950).
5 Ga. App. 353, 63 S.E. 270 (1908).
80 Ga. App. 885, 57 S.E.2d 824 (1950).
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that a true provision for liquidated damages will control the damage award,
whereas a penalty will not be enforced. Plaintiff company had sold a new
car to the defendant under a contract whereby the defendant agreed that
he would not resell the car within a year without first offering it to the
plaintiff at the sales price less 3% for each month the defendant had held
the auto. It was provided that the defendant would pay $750 "liquidated
damages"-if he sold without first offering to the plaintiff. The trial court
sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground that the provision
amounted to a penalty. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
clause provided for liquidated damages and not for a penalty. Distinguishing between liquidated damages and a penalty is often a difficult task and
such seems to be true of this case. The court found the following things supporting the view that the provision amounted to liquidated damages: the
subject matter of the contract was such that it would be very difficult to
measure accurately the amount of the plaintiff's damage, the situation made
it more expedient to stipulate damages than to try to calculate them after
a breach and, although not controlling, the fact that the parties used the
term "liquidated damages" is some indication of their intent. The court
seemed to be somewhat impressed by the fact that the plaintiff was attempting to keep autos off the so-called black market. Of course there would
seem to be nothing to prevent the plaintiff from reselling on the black
market himself if he repurchased the car.
During the period of this survey the Court of Appeals reaffirmed, in two
cases," the well-established principle that the proper measure of damage to
automobiles is the difference between the fair market value immediately
before and the fair market value immediately following the injury.
In Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop'2 the plaintiff was suing for
injuries sustained when he swallowed a bone fragment in one of the defendant's barbecue sandwiches. Among other things, the plaintiff asked
for loss of expected profits from his candy manufacturing business. It appeared in evidence that the factory was closed while the plaintiff was ill,
partly because the foreman was away drunk. Although the case was disposed of on another ground, the court stated that the expected profits here
were too speculative and remote to allow recovery. The rule announced by
the court to the effect that prospective profits must be established with
certainty is definite and well-established. But like many other rules of damage the application of such a rule is hard to predict.
The damage problem in Smith v. Hightower" was one of mitigation.
Plaintiff's household furniture was damaged by weather after the roof of
the house he was renting from the defendant was removed over the plaintiff's objection. In reversing a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim
for damages, Maclntyre, P. J., found that the evidence warranted a decision for the plaintiff. He noted that the question of whether the plaintiff
had taken proper steps to avoid the damage was for the jury.
11. Crews v. Sayre, 80 Ga. App. 335,.56 S.E.2d 151 (1949); Bedgood v. Rogers, 81 Ga.
App. 343, 58 S.E.2d 473 (1950).
12. 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949).

13. 80 Ga. App. 293, 55 S.E.2d 872 (1949).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By JOHN L.

WESTMORELAND*

STATUTES

The General Assembly of Georgia, during the 1950 regular session,
enacted three statutes modifying and repealing existing statutes dealing
with divorce and domestic relations.
Probably the most important change in the divorce laws of Georgia was
the amendment by the I95O Legislature of Code Section 30-107 reducing
the required period of a petitioner's residence within the state before
filing an application for divorce from twelve months to six months.' The
residence requirment of twelve months was enacted 'in 1893, and this
amendment is the only change in the period of required residence since that
time.
The significance of this amendment can easily be seen by comparing
the period of residence now required in Georgia with the residence requirements of Surrounding Southeastern states. Florida2 is the only one of the.
surrounding states having a residence period less than that of Georgia.
The period in Georgia is now equal to that of North Carolina 3 and is from
six to eighteen months less than the period required in the states of Alabama, 4 Mississippi,5 South Carolina, 6 and Tennessee.7
The immediate results of the reduction of this period of residence
cannot be seen; however, it is the opinion of the writer that by reason of
this amendment there will be a sharp increase in the number of divorces
granted in the State of Georgia.
In connection with the amendment of Code Section 30-107 by the i95o
Legislature, it should be pointed out that no change has been made in
the period required for a person who is a resident of an Army Post or
Military Reservation to obtaina divorce,, that period remaining one year
next preceding the filing of a petition.
The second statute was the amendment of Code Section 30-I12. This
section, before it was amended, provided- that after a suit for divorce
is filed no transfer of property by the husband, except bona fide in payment of pre-existing debts, shall pass title so as to avoid the vesting of the
property in accordance with the final verdict of the jury. The amendment
provided that this section was operative only if lis pendens notice was
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

*Member Atlanta Bar; A.B., 1914, Mercer University; LL.B., 1915, University of
Georgia; Member American and Georgia Bar Associations.
Ga. Laws 1950, p. 429.
FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1943) (ninety days prior to filing petition).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-5(4) (Supp. 1949) (six months next preceding filing
the petition).
ALA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-27, 34-29 and §§ 34-20, 34-22 (Supp. 1947) (one year where
brought on ground of voluntary abandonment or where defendant is a non-resident;
two years where brought on ground of non-support).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2735 (1942) (one year prior to filing petition).
S. C. Acts of 1949, Nos. 95 and 137. (one year prior to filing petition).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8428 (1932) (two years next preceding filing of petition).
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duly filed. The amendment brought divorce suits in line with all other
suits as to notice of lis pendens. Hereafter, if it is desired by a wife, as
petitioner, to prevent her husband from disposing of his property in a
divorce case, she must file the lis pendens notice.'
The third statute repealed Code Section 53-504, which section provided
that a contract of sale by a wife of her separate estate to her husband
or to a trustee was not valid unless approved by order of the superior
court? This is more evidence of the opinion that wives are able to look
after themselves.
DECISIONS

In the amendment to the divorce law of 1946, there was included a
provision for a thirty day period to elapse before the judgment and decree
became final. In the opinion of the writer, this was an unfortunate provision in the way in which it was included.
During the past year, there have been several cases construing and attempting to clarify this amendment which was enacted in 1946 to Code
Section 30-101, and which has caused so much confusion and uncertainty
in appellate procedure in divorce cases."° This amendment provided for
some person at interest to file a motion to set aside and vacate, within
thirty days, a verdict or judgment granting a total divorce or granting a
total divorce and alimony.
In the case of Degouras v. Degouras" the Supreme Court dismissed, on
general demurrer, a petition filed by the plaintiff within thirty days from
the date of the verdict and judgment to modify and set aside the said
verdict and judgment, and held that where such a petition is filed, it must
set forth "good and sufficient grounds" for the modification or setting.
aside of the verdict and judgment.
In the case of Carnegie v. Ca-rnegie" the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court, holding that where the defendant has actual knowledge of
divorce proceedings, and has failed to appear and defend, but within the
thirty days after the grantifig of the divorce, comes into court and files
a petition to modify and set aside the divorce judgment, such petition
must be based upon "good and sufficient grounds" meeting the requirements
of a motion for a new trial in substance and forrri, including a brief of the
evidence where the evidence is necessary to the consideration of the
grounds alleged. In this case, the petition to modify and set aside the
divorce judgment merely denied-the allegations of plaintiff's petition for
divorce and set up a counter-claim for divorce and alimony, and the court
held that these allegations did not meet the requirements for "good and
sufficientgrounds" being alleged. The court also held in this case, that
although Code Section 30-101 provides "if such a petition is filed, it will
be decided by the judge, unless a jury trial of the issues raised thereby is
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Ga. Laws 1950, p. 365.

Ga.
Ga.
205
206
723
179

Laws 1950, p. 174.
Laws 1946, pp. 90, 91, GA. CODE ANN. § 30-101 (Supp. 1947).
Ga. 362, 53 S.E.2d 759 (1949).
Ga. 77, 55 S.E.2d 583 (1949). See also Allison v. Allison, 204 Ga. 202, 48 S.E.2d
(1948) ; I-ruguley v. Huguley, 204 Ga. 692, 51 S.E.2d 445 (1949) ; Lucas v. Lucas,
Ga. 821, 177 S.E. 684 (1934) ; Wrenn v. Allen, 180 Ga. 613, 180 S.E. 104 (1935).
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demanded by any party,"' 3 and a jury trial is demanded by the party filing
the petition, the legal question of whether the petition sets forth good and
sufficient grounds for the relief sought is to be determined by the court,
and the petitioner was not entitled to have the legal sufficiency of the
grounds determined by a jury, although a jury trial of the issues raised
was demanded by the petitioner. The term "issues raised," as provided
in Code Section 30-101,1 means issues of fact only, and not the legal
sufficiency of the petition. The Supreme Court, in this case, re-emphasized
that the language used in the cases of Dugas v. Dugas'5 and Thompson v.
Thompson" could not be construed to mean that the filing of a petition
to modify and set aside a divorce judgment within thirty days of the rendition of that judgment entitled the petitioner to a de novo trial as a
matter of right, or to the automatic legislative grant of a new trial.
The case of Davis v. Davis 7 held that Code Section 3O-lOi, providing
for the filing of a motion to modify and set aside a judgment for divorce
and alimony within thirty days from the date of such verdict and judgment,
applies only in cases where a divorce is granted. The Supreme Court, in
this case, held that where a jury refused to grant a divorce to either party,
but granted the wife a specific sum of alimony for the support of the
plaintiff and the minor child, that the judgment for alimony was unauthorized.because the jury denied a divorce to both parties, the prayer
for alimony being dependent upon and incidental to her prayer for divorce,
and that a motion by the defendant to set aside the judgment filed after
thirty days had expired from the date of the judgment, but within the
same term of Court, was the proper procedure.
The case of Armstrong v. Armstrong" also involved the question of
filing a motion to set aside a verdict and decree, and the Supreme Court
held, in this case, that a judgment woud not be set aside on the ground that
it was entered because of corrupt and willful perjury, unless it appeared
that the person charged with perjury had been duly convicted thereof and
that the judgment was based on such testimony alone. This case also held
that a petition for divorce and'alimony, containing allegations as to title
and ownership of real and personal property being in the plaintiff, showed
on its face the purpose to have title to such property decreed in the plaintiff, and absence of specific prayers to that effect was an amendable defect,
and want of such prayer was cured by the judgment."
In the case of Adams v. Adams 2° the Supreme Court held that in a suit
for divorce, alimony and custody, where the defendant, by direct bill of
exceptions, assigns error upon the sustaining of a demurrer filed by the
plaintiff to the defendant's answer, the bill of exceptions must be dismissed
on the ground that there is no assignment of error upon a final judgment
of the trial court.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

GA. CODE ANN. § 30-101 (Supp. 1947).
Ibid.
201 Ga. 190, 39 S.E.2d 658 (1946).
203 Ga. 128, 45 S.E.2d 632 (1947).
206 Ga. 559, 57 S.E.2d 673 (1950).
206 Ga. 540, 57 S.E.2d 668 (1950).
GA. CODE § 110-705 (1933).
206 Ga. 857, 59 S.E.2d 375 (1950).
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The recent case of Shivers v. Shivers2' held that the superior court has
plenary power over its orders and judgments during the term at which
entered, and may amend, correct or revoke them, for the purpose of
promoting justice at such term on the court's own motion, without notice
to either party. In this case, the Superior Court of Cobb County revoked
a custody decree during the same term, awarding a minor child to the
plaintiff in a divorce suit in Cobb County, where it appeared that the
minor child had previously been awarded to the defendant in a divorce
suit in Florida.
The case of Bell v. Bell2 2 explains the appellate procedure where a
divorce is denied, holding that where a divorce is granted, a petition to
modify or set aside a verdict or judgment must be filed within thirty days
from the date of the verdict or judgment, but that when a divorce is
denied, a review by a motion for new trial, without such petition to modify
or set aside, is an available procedure. This case also held that where the
defendant had been divorced by a former wife, and the jury in that action
placed disabilities on his remarriage which were never removed, subsequent
ceremonial marriage of the defendant with the plaintiff was invalid, and the
defendant was not estopped from attacking the validity of the marriage,
although the plaintiff entered into marriage in good faith, so that the
plaintiff could not prevail in her action for divorce and alimony, and that
the marital status of citizens is a matter of public interest and concern, and
that rules of estoppel between parties cannot be invoked to determine the
validity of a marriage.
It is the opinion of the writer, as well as the hope of the writer, that
at the next session of the Legislature, this provision of the law will be
changed, so that the final judgment and decree of the court in a divorce
case will be final on the date rendered, and will have the same force and
effect as any other judgment and decree of the court, and the requirements as to further procedure will be the same as are now applicable to
final judgments and decrees.
The case of Powell v. Powell2" is a very interesting decision dealing
with the jurisdiction and venue of the court in a divorce suit. In this case,
the Supreme Court held that where a wife files her suit for divorce in one
county and the husband comes in and files a plea to the jurisdiction and
a cross-action, and the wife dismisses her suit for divorce and files another
suit for divorce in the county alleged to be the residence of the husband,
the husband cannot, by dismissing his plea to the jurisdiction, unknown
to the plaintiff, procure a divorce on his cross-action. It was pointed out
in this case that when the wife dismissed her suit in the first county, that.
court was divested of jurisdiction of the case before the hearing on the
cross-action. This case also held that such a petition could be amended as
other petitions. The case of Respess v. Lites24 is a case dealing with another
jurisdictional question. Here, the court held that. failure to mail a notice
of the date of the final hearing of the adoption proceeding to the natural
21.
22.
23.
24.

206 Ga. 552, 57 S.E.2d 660 (1950).
206 Ga. 194, 56 S.E.2d 289 (1949).
207 Ga. 1, 59 S.E.2d 718 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 110, 57 S.E.2d 869 (1950).
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father, who was required to be served in the first instance, was jurisdictional, and the trial judge did not have jurisdiction W finally hear and
determine the case. It-was also held in this case that notice to the attorney
for the natural father was not a compliance with the statute providing for
26
service.25" In connection with this case, see the case of Brewer v. Brewer,
where the court held that a petition for contempt for non-payment of
alimony may be served on the defendant's counsel of record. Also in this
connection, see the case of Chamnbers v. Chambers,"7 where the court held
that a person who is non compos mentis, though not legally adjudged to
be insane, is incapable of being served with a petition for divorce, and a
judgment in an uncontested divorce suit, which is predicated upon such
service, may be set aside in a proceeding by a next friend.
In the case of Lcvine v. Levinc 28 the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court, holding that a charge by the court, that the jury would be authorized
to find against a divorce on the ground of cruel treatment, if because of the
same, the parties mutually agree to separate, was erroneous.
The Declaratory Judgment Act " has been applicable in the recent case
of Wright v. WJ'right" where the husband filed a petition for a declaratory
judgment and an accounting on permanent alimony where, subsequent to
the rendition of the judgment against the husband for permanent alimony,
the whole family was re-established in normal family relationship. In this
case, Justices Wyatt and Candler concurred specially, but were of the
opinion that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law without regard
to the declaratory judgment law.
Price v. Price3 ' involves the question of whether, where a husband
buys land with his own money and has the land conveyed to his wife, there
is a gift to the wife or a resulting trust in favor of the husband. In this
case the Supreme Court held that there is a rebuttable presumption that
the property is a gift to the wife, and that in order to rebut such presumption, the proof must be clear and convincing. It was further held that a
suit by the husband against his former wife to have an implied resulting
trust decreed in favor of the husband was not barred under the doctrines
of res judicata or estoppel by judgment, where such matters were not
within the scope of the'pleadings and were not actually litigated in the
divorce and'alimony case.
In connection with the question of res judicata, see the case of Mize v.
M4ize,32 where the court held that a money demand between husband and
wife may be joined in a divorce action, and where the issues presented by
the pleadings in the divorce suit could have been inquired into and adjudicated, and adjudication of the divorce suit on its merits, either by demurrer
or otherwise, is res judicata of all issues presented in the pending suit.
The question of custody of minor children is usually the most contested
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

GA. CODE ANN. § 74-414 (Supp. 1947).
206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593 (1949).
206 Ga. 796, 58 S.E.2d 814 (1950).
206 Ga. 234, 56 S.E.2d 266 (1949).
Ga. Laws 1945, p. 137, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 110-1101 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
205 Ga. 524, 54 S.E.2d 596 (1949).
205 Ga. 623, 54 S.E.2d 578 (1949).
80 Ga. App. 441, 56 S.E.2d 121 (1949).
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issue between the parties in a domestic relations case, and the determination of custody of rinor children must be decided on the basis of what is
in the best interest of the children, and what will best promote their welfare and happiness. In the case of Adams v. 4dams33 the Supreme Court
refused to interfere with the judgment of the trial judge in awarding the
custody of minor children where the evidence failed clearly to show an
abuse of the discretion vested in the trial judge. During the past year
there have been many decisions holding that a decree awarding the custody
of a minor child or children, without any reservation of jurisdiction, is final
and conclusive, and that the principle of res judicata is applicable unless a
material change of circumstances, subsequent to the date of the decree
awarding the custody and substantially affecting the welfare of the child or
children, is made to appear.3"
During recent months there have been numerous court decisions establishing new judicial precedents concerning citations for contempt for
violations of orders of the court. In the recent case of Ozborn v. State"
the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a divorce judgment awarding
custody of minor children to the mother and providing for alimony did
not preclude the conviction of the father, who failed to comply with the
judgment, for abandonment of the minor children. The court emphasized
in this case that a judgment for alimony is not necessarily a bar to a prosecution for abandonment.
In the case of Sells v. Sells3" the court held that a contract between
a husband and wife, made with the intention of promoting a dissolution of
the marriage relation, is contrary to public policy and is void, and held
in this case that the agreement, entered into after the separation had taken
place, providing for alimony and attorney's fees should the wife enter a
suit for divorce, was valid and enforceable.
On the question of an alimony decree being excessive, see the case of
Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 7 where the court held that the verdict of the jury,
awarding the wife $i5o per month alimony, was not excessive, as a matter
of law, under the evidence as presented of the parties' earnings.
The case of Adams v. Pafford38 is an interesting case on the question
of what property is owned by the wife during coverture. The court held
that property acquired or purchased by the wife during coverture, with
her own money, becomes her separate property, and that all property
acquired prior to her marriage, and that given to her individually during
marriage, becomes part of her separate estate. It was also held in this
case that there was a presumption that property bought partly by the
husband and partly by the wife is a gift to the wife, but that this presumption may be rebutted.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

206 Ga. 881, 59 S.E.2d 366 (1950).
In this connection, see: Bowers v. Bowers, 205 Ga. 761, 55 S.E.2d 152 (1949) ; Leftwich v. Cook, 79 Ga. App. 585, 54 S.E.2d 455 (1949) ; Madison v. Montgomery, 206
Ga. 199, 56 S.E.2d 292 (1949) ; Elders v. Elders, 206 Ga. 297, 57 S.E.2d 83 (1950)
and Crawford v. Jones, 205 Ga. 764, 55 S.E.2d 215 (1949).
79 Ga. App. 823, 54 S.E.2d 376 (1949).
206 Ga. 650, 58 S.E.2d 186 (1950).
206 Ga. 41, 55 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
79 Ga. App. 477, 54 S.E,2d 329 (1949).
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The case of Williams v. Williams" is an unusual case involving modification of a temporary alimony order. In this case an agreement between
the parties providing that the husband should pay the wife the sum of
$272.00 per month as temporary alimony was made the judgment of the
court. Nine months later the husband filed a petition to modify and reduce
the amount of alimony on the ground of a change of circumstances. The
court reduced the amount to $25o.00 per month, to which order the husband excepted. On appeal, it was held that the award by the lower court
of $250.00 per month where the income of the husband was $35o.oo per
month was excessive, and was an abuse of discretion by the lower court.
Gardner v. Gardner"° is another interesting case involving divorce and
alimony. In this case the Supreme Court held that where the wife files
a suit for divorce and alimony, and the husband files a cross-action, and
the jury returns a verdict in the statutory form, the verdict should be
construed to be that a divorce was granted on the wife's petition rather
than on the husband's cross-bill. And in such a case, where the jury denies
alimony to the wife, such denial of alimony is contrary to law and evidence
where it appeared that the wife had no separate estate or means of support,
and that the husband was able to support her. This case also held that a
jury was without authority, after refusing to grant the wife permanent
alimony, to decide how property owned by the parties as tenants in common could be used and sold.
There are several recent decisions involving the granting of alimony
at and before the appearance term of the court. Fowler v. Fowler4" held
that judgment for alimony based on written agreement between the parties
was.not void on the ground that alimony was not prayed for, or on the
ground that alimony was awarded at the appearance term of the court,
and that the defendant's waiver of service of process in advance of filing.
of the petition was good as between the parties in absence of fraud. However, in the case of Gaither v. Gaither42 the court held that a judgment
awarding the wife permanent alimony before the appearance term, although based on an agreement between the parties, was invalid and that
the husband was entitled to cancellation of the judgment on the ground
that the judgment was void for want of jurisdiction of the husband's person, and for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, but held that the
agreement was valid between the parties. On further appeal to the Supreme
Court. that court held that where the non-resident husband files a petition
in equity to cancel the consent alimony judgment, he submits himself, for
all purposes of that suit, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the county in
which that suit is pending; that the wife has a right to amend her crossaction and to set up against the husband the prior alimony agreement
entered into between the parties upon which the judgment was based; and
that as the husband moved from the State immediately after judgment was
entered, the agreement made in 1929 was not barred by the Statute of
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Limitatiohs and was germane to the suit brought by the husband to set
aside such judgment. 3
In the case of Murray v. Murray" the Supreme Court held that where
a suit for divorce is still pending when a hearing on an ancillary petition
for temporary support of a child is held, although -more than three years
after filing of the suit for divorce, it is proper for the court to award a
a sum of money for the support of the child retroactive to the date of
filing the original petition for divorce, covering the period from the time
the divorce suit was filed until the hearing on the ancillary petition.
The case of Kenimer v. State 5 established a new judicial precedent in
prosecutions for criminal contempt in violating orders of the court. In
this case, criminal contempt proceedings were brought by the State of
Georgia against Kenimer for violation of an order of court by removing
a minor child, previously awarded to the wife, from the jurisdictional
limits of the state for a Period of 238 days. The trial judge found the
defendant husband guilty of 238 separate acts of contempt, and imposed
a fine of $5o.oo and imprisonment of five days on each of the 238 contempt
charges against the husband, or a total of $1 1,900.00 fine and confinement
in jail for over three years. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it was
held that it was proper to find the husband guilty of 238 separate contempt
offenses and that the court had the right to impose punishment for :each
offense, although the total exceeded the legal limits for one offense, but
held, on the other hand, that the sentence in the case seemed to include
multiple and cumulative punishment for a single design, and that the
cumulative result and effect of the judgment was excessive, cruel and
unusual, and contrary to the spirit of the law of the state, and against the
policy of the law of the state. A minority dissented, on the ground that
where the punishment did not exceed that prescribed by law, the Court
of Appeals could not legally reverse or set aside the judgment of the trial
judge on the ground that the sum total of the punishment was excessive,
cruel and unusual. The contention of the defendant, that the violation of
the order of the court should be treated as one offense because his conduct
was one continuous action, was disregarded in this case, on the theory
that each day the defendant was outside of the jurisdiction of the court
he. interfered with the administration of the court, and each dav prevented
the court from considering and determining the case, and, therefore, each
day was a separate and distinct contempt of the order of the court.
In an action brought for contempt, based on non-payment of alimony
by the husband, it was held that the divorced husband, by non-payment of
alimony, waived any right to insist upon the wife's resuming her maiden
name in accordance with an agreement between the parties. " In the case
47 the
of Borders v. Borders
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in
holding the defendant in contempt of court for failure to comply with an
order of the court providing for payment of temporary alimony and attorneys' fees.
43. 206 Ga. 808, 58 S.E.2d 834 (1950).
44. 206 Ga. 702, 58 S.E.2d 420 (1950).
45. 81 Ga. App. 437, 59 S.E.2d 296 (1950).
46. Burks v. Mullins, 206 Ga. 603, 57 S.E.2d 926 (1950).
47. 206 Ga. 191, 56 S.E.2d 517 (1949).
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In the case of Pharrv. Pharr" the Supreme Court held that a husband's
voluntary conveyance to his second wife was not a fradulent conveyance,
and could not be cancelled in a petition by his first wife, who had previously
obtained a judgment for permanent alimony. It was also held in this case
that a judgment for permanent alimony does not create a lien on the
divorced husband's realty for future installments where no such lien is
expressly created in the judgment.
There are several recent decisions by the appellate courts which, although not falling within any particular category, are nevertheless related
to the field of domestic relations. Brewer v. Brewer49 holds that condonation and cohabitation, after filing a suit for divorce, if conditioned upon
the promise of the defendant not to again be guilty of the act charged in
the petition, will not prevent the plaintiff from proceeding with the
original petition for divorce in the event of a breach of the condition and
agreement on the part of the defendant. The court also held that the fact
that the parties may have moved out of the State of Georgia after the
suit was filed and served would not cause the court to lose jurisdiction of
the case then pending in that court. The suit had not died nor abated and
was not dismissed in effect by the mere act of condonation.
McDade v. Wes 5 ° raises, for the first time in Georgia, the question of
whether or not a wife has a cause of action against a third party for the
loss of consortium of her husband for injuries suffered by him. In this
case, the Court of Appeals was equally divided on this question and did not
decide the point, affirming the lower court which dismissed the suit on
demurrer on another ground.
Roberts v. Employers Insurance Company of Alabama5 involved the
meaning of the word "dependent" as used in an insurance policy. It was
held in this case that the word "dependent," as used in an insurance policy,
which policy provided for payment to the wife after proof of death of any
"dependent" member of the immediate family of the wife, meant dependent
to a partial extent or degree, and not legally dependent in the sense that
there was any legal obligation imposed at common law or by statute, and
held that whether the husband of the wife was a dependent in the particular case was a question for the jury.
In the case of Skelton v. Gambrell52 the Court of Appeals held that the
parent of a i4 year-old child could not be held liable for an independent
act of that child, in negligently shooting another with a pistol, merely by
reason of the relationship. Such liability must rest upon the same grounds
that would make that parent responsible for the negligence of any other
person.
In the case of Perthus v. Paul[ the Court of Appeals held that an action
for fraud and deceit, rather than an action for breach of promise, was
stated wherein the plaintiff prayed for punitive damages and alleged that
he was induced to give up employment in Massachusetts and come to
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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Georgia by the false representation of the defendant that she had obtained
a divorce from her former husband and was free to marry.
The order of descent and distribution of property is governed by the
validity or invalidity of a marriage. There are several recent decisions
dealing with the question whether or not a marriage will be presumed to
be valid under certain situations and circumstances. Carroll v. Hill" was
an action by the widow of the deceased to have a year's support set aside
to her; and the executrix and a creditor of the deceased filed a caveat to the
return of the appraisers setting aside the year's support to the widow on the
ground that she was not the legal widow of the deceased by reason of a
previous, undissolved marriage. In this case there was a conflict between
presumptions of validity of first and second marriages. There is a presumption of validity of a second marriage, even though a previous marriage
of one of the parties be shown; however, there is also the presumption of
the continuance of the previous marriage and a presumption of invalidity
of the second marriage. In this .case, the court resolved the presumption
in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and held that since the
caveators were asserting the invalidity of the second marriage, they were
required to carry the burden of proof on that issue, notwithstanding the
fact that that burden required proving the negative fact that the prior
marriage had never been dissolved. The court held in this case that the
caveators had failed to carry that burden of proof, and held that the
second marriage was valid.
Azar v. Thomas55 is a recent case also dealing with the presumption in
favor of a second marriage. In this case the administrator brought a suit
in equity to cancel an alleged void marriage and to recover assets belonging
to the estate of the plaintiff's deceased, alleging that the second marriage
of the defendant to the plantiff's deceased was void on the ground that
a prior divorce decree obtained in another state by the defendant from
his former wife was void. It was held in this case that when a marriage has
been regularly solemnized and the parties have lived together as man and
wife, that there is a presumption that the marriage is valid, and such presumption can be negatived only by disproving every reasonable possibility
against the validity of the marriage. However, it was held sufficient to
overcome the presumption of the validity of the second marriage that a
general search of the court records of the state in which the spouse effecting the second marriage had established residence showed that no divorce
had been granted. It was held also that it was error for the trial court to
refuse to allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence attacking the divorce
decree obtained by the defendant from his former wife, and the decision
of the lower court was reversed.
A similar result was reached in the case of Carterv. Graves." In this case
Graves filed a caveat to the proceeding by the executrix to probate the will
of the deceased on the ground that Graves married the deceased subsequent
to the execution of a will by the deceased, which will was not made in contemplation of a future marriage and was therefore void. It was proved by
54. 80 Ga. App. 576, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949).
55. 206 Ga. 588, 57 S.E.2d 821 (1950).
56. 206 Ga. 234, 56 S.E.2d 917 (1949).
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the propounder of the will that the caveator had not obtained a valid divorce from his former wife prior to his marriage to the deceased, and that
even though the divorce decree might be valid, the caveator, subsequent to
the date of the divorce decree and prior to the alleged marriage to the deceased, had entered into a common law marriage with another woman. It
was held in this case, that assuming that no final decree had been granted in
the divorce suit, granting a divorce based upon a ceremonial marriage, when
considered in connection with the fact that both the parties were in life and
*neither had obtained any other divorce, that these facts would be sufficient
to overcome the presumption of the validity of the ceremonial marriage to
the deceased, and that a proved ceremonial marriage will prevail over a
presumption of marriage founded on cohabitation and repute, yet such
a ceremonial marriage will not prevail over a properly proved previous
common law marriage.

